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Abstract. The causal structure of any system can be analyzed at a multitude of spatial and temporal 
scales. It has long been thought that while higher scale (macro) descriptions of causal structure may be 
useful to observers, they are at best a compressed description and at worse leave out critical information. 
However, recent research applying information theory to causal analysis has shown that the causal 
structure of some systems can actually come into focus (be more informative) at a macroscale (Hoel et al. 
2013). That is, a macro model of a system (a map) can be more informative than a fully detailed model of 
the system (the territory). This has been called “causal emergence.” While causal emergence may at first 
glance seem counterintuitive, this paper grounds the phenomenon in a classic concept from information 
theory: Shannon’s discovery of the channel capacity. I argue that systems have a particular causal 
capacity, and that different causal models of those systems take advantage of that capacity to various 
degrees. For some systems, only macroscale causal models use the full causal capacity. Such macroscale 
causal models can either be coarse-grains, or may leave variables and states out of the model (exogenous) 
in various ways, which can improve the model’s efficacy and its informativeness via the same 
mathematical principles of how error-correcting codes take advantage of an information channel’s 
capacity. As model choice increase, the causal capacity of a system approaches the channel capacity. 
Ultimately, this provides a general framework for understanding how the causal structure of some 
systems cannot be fully captured by even the most detailed microscopic model. 
 
Introduction. It has been difficult to find a causal 
role for the macroscales of a system (Fodor 1974; 
Kim 2000). But a way forward is to consider this 
issue not as a philosophical problem but rather as a 
problem of causal model choice. Causal models 
are those that represent the influence of subparts of 
a system on other subparts, or over the system as a 
whole. A causal model may represent state 
transitions, like Markov chains, or may represent 
the influence or connectivity of elements, such as 
circuit diagrams, directed graphs (also called 
causal Bayesian networks), networks of 
interconnected mechanisms, or neuron diagrams. 
Using causal models in the form of networks of 
logic gates, actual causal emergence was first 
demonstrated in Hoel et al. (2013). Causal 
emergence is when the macro beats the micro in 
terms of the efficacy, informativeness, or power of 
its causal relationships. It is identified by 
comparing macroscales to their underlying 
microscales, and analyzing the causal structure of 
both using information theory. Here it is revealed 
that causal emergence is related to a classic 
concept in information theory, Shannon’s channel 
capacity (Shannon 1949), thus grounding it 
rigorously in another well-known mathematical 
phenomenon. 
There is a natural, but unremarked upon, 
connection between causation and information 
theory. Both causation and information are defined 
in respect to the nonexistent: causation relies on 
counterfactual statements, and information theory 
on unsent signals. While their similarities have not 
been enumerated explicitly, it is unsurprising that 
a combination of the two has begun to gain 
traction. Causal analysis is performed on a set of 
interacting elements or state transitions, i.e., a 
causal model, and the hope is that information 
theory is the best way to quantify and formalize 
these interactions and transitions. 
Some information-theoretic constructs 
already use quasi-causal language; measurements 
like granger causality (Granger 1969), directed 
information (Massey 1990), and transfer entropy 
(Schreiber 2000). Despite being interesting and 
useful measures, these either fail to accurately 
measure causation, or are too vague and 
underdeveloped (Janzing et al. 2013). More 
explicit attempts to tie information theory to 
causation use Judea Pearl’s causal calculus (Pearl 
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2000). These measures rely on intervention, 
formalized as the do(x) operator (the distinctive 
aspect of causal analysis). Stated in the most 
general manner possible, the idea is to calculate 
the mutual information I(X,Y) between a set of 
interventions (X) and their effects (Y). One such 
measure is the information flow (Ay and Polani 
2008), which was essentially renamed and 
rediscovered in Korb et al. (2009). But the most 
explicit connection between causation and 
information can be traced back to a measure 
named effective information (EI), which assesses 
the causal influence of one subset of a system on 
another (Tononi 2001; Tononi and Sporns 2003). 
When EI is assessed over the entire system (that is, 
the mutual information between the full repertoire 
of system states) it captures how effective and 
informative a system’s causal structure is. Used 
this way, EI represents a quantification of “deep 
understanding”, defined by Judea Pearl as 
“knowing not merely how things behaved 
yesterday but also how things will behave under 
new hypothetical circumstances” (Pearl 2000). For 
instance, in Hoel et al. (2013) it was shown that EI 
is the average effect information of a system’s 
states. Effect information is the causal influence of 
an individual system state, defined as how much 
the state reduces the uncertainty about the future 
of the system. EI is used here because of its 
previous usage to demonstrate causal emergence 
(Hoel et al. 2013), its relative historical 
precedence, its proven link to important properties 
of causal structure (Hoel et al. 2013), and mutual 
information’s understandability and its role as the 
centerpiece of information theory. First EI is 
introduced, its relationship to causal structure is 
shown, its relationship to mutual information is 
proven, and then the measure is used to 
demonstrate how systems have a particular causal 
capacity that resembles an information channel’s 
capacity, which different causal models of the 
system take advantage of to differing degrees. 
 
Assessing causal structure with information 
theory. To measure EI, first the do(x) operator is 
used to set a system S into a particular state si at 
some time t and observing the effects at some time 
t+1. More broadly, there is an application of some 
Intervention Distribution (ID) composed of the 
probabilities of each do(si). The results of applying 
ID to the system is the Effect Distribution (ED), that 
is, the effects of ID. A uniform distribution of 
interventions is applied over the full set of system 
states such that in ID each p is 1/n, where n is the 
number of states. This is identical to intervening 
upon the system using the maximum entropy 
distribution (ID = Hmax): perturbing some system S 
into all n possible initial states with equal 
probability (1/n) so that (𝑑𝑜 𝑆 = 𝑠! ∀!∈ 1… 𝑛). 
In a memoryless system with the Markov property 
ID is applied at some time t, and ED is the 
distribution of states transitioned into at t+1. 
 From the application of ID a Transition 
Probability Matrix (TPM) is constructed using 
Bayes’ rule. The TPM associates each state si in S 
with a probability distribution of past states (SP |S 
= si) that could have lead to it, and a probability 
distribution of future states that it could lead to (SF 
|S = si). Note that a TPM can be obtained for a 
system with specified elements and mechanisms, 
like a system of interconnected logic gates, or for a 
Markov chain defined only as state transitions, or 
from a Bayesian causal network, and so on. In 
fact, the defining feature of a causal model seems 
to be that it can be represented as a TPM. 
 EI quantifies the architecture of the TPM. 
In a discrete finite system, EI is: 
 𝐸𝐼 𝑆 = 1𝑛 𝐷!"!!∈! 𝑆!|𝑑𝑜(𝑆 = 𝑠!)||𝐸!  
 
where n is the number of system states and DKL is 
the Kullback-Leibler divergence (Kullback 1997). 
The effect information of an individual state is 𝐷!" 𝑆!|𝑑𝑜(𝑆 = 𝑠!)||𝐸! , which is the difference 
that state si makes to the future of the system. If all 
states transition with equal probability to all states 
then no state makes any difference to the future of 
the system. Conversely, if all states transition to 
the same state, then no state makes any difference 
to the future of the system. If each state transitions 
to a single other state that no other state transitions 
to, then and only then does each state make the 
maximal difference to the future of the system. 
Only then is EI maximal. 
 The relationship between causation and 
information was directly proven in Hoel et al. 
(2013). There it was shown that EI is equal to the 
mutual information I(C,E), where C is a set of 
causes (defined as some set of states) and E the set 
of their subsequent effects (the states they 
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transition to). An identical formulation is as the 
mutual information between interventions and 
their effects, such that EI = I(ID, ED). There it was 
also proven that EI is sensitive to important 
properties of causal relationships like determinism 
(the noise of state-to-state transitions, which is 
also the sufficiency of a cause to accomplish an 
effect), degeneracy (how often states transition to 
the same state, which is also the necessity of a 
cause), and complexity (the size of the state-space, 
or the number of possible causes).  
 To demonstrate EI’s ability to accurately 
quantify causal structure, consider the TPMs (t by 
t+1) of three Markov chains, each with n = 4 states 
[00, 01, 10, 11]: 
 
M1=
0 0 1 01 0 0 00 0 0 10 1 0 0 . 
 
M2=
1/3 1/3 1/3 01/3 1/3 1/3 00 0 0 10 0 0 1 . 
 
M3=
1/4 1/4 1/4 1/41/4 1/4 1/4 1/41/4 1/4 1/4 1/41/4 1/4 1/4 1/4 . 
 
Note that in M1 every state completely constrains 
both the past and future, while the states of M2 
constrain the past/future only to some degree, and 
finally M3 is entirely unconstrained (the 
probability of any state-to-state transition is 1/n). 
This affects the chains’ respective EI values: 
EI(M1) = 2 bits, EI(M2) = 1 bit, EI(M3) = 0 bits. 
Given that the systems are the same size (n), their 
differences in EI stem from their differing levels 
of effectiveness (Fig. 1), a value which is bounded 
between 0 and 1. Effectiveness (eff) is how 
successful a causal structure is in turning 
interventions into unique effects. In Figure 1 the 
three chains are drawn above their TPMs. 
Probabilities are represented in grayscale (black is 
p = 1).  
The effectiveness of a particular TPM is 
decomposable into two factors: the determinism 
and degeneracy of the TPM. Determinism is a 
measure of how reliable state-to-state transitions 
are, assessed by comparing the possible effects of 
each state (SF |S = si) to the maximum entropy 
distribution Hmax: 
 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚 𝑆 = 1𝑛 𝐷!" 𝑆!|𝑑𝑜(𝑆 = 𝑠!)||𝐻!"#log!(𝑛)!!∈!  
 
A low determinism is a mark of noise. Degeneracy 
on the other hand measures how much 
deterministic convergence there is among the 
effects of states (convergence/overlap not due to 
noise): 
 
 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝑆 = 𝐷!"(𝐸!||𝐻!"#)log!(𝑛)  
 
A high degeneracy is a mark of attractor 
dynamics. Together, determinism and degeneracy 
contribute equally to eff, which is how effective a 
system is at transforming interventions into 
effects, or past states into future ones: 
 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑆) = 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚(𝑆) − 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦(𝑆). 
 
If a system has eff = 1 then all of its state-
to-state transitions are logical biconditionals of the 
form si⇔sk. A relationship which is a logical 
biconditional can only occur if si is both 
completely sufficient and utterly necessary to 
produce sk. See Hoel et al. (2013) for further 
details on effectiveness, determinism, and 
degeneracy. Additionally, see Hoel et al. (2016) 
for how eff contributes to how a causal 
relationship acts when partitioned. 
The total EI of a system depends not 
solely on eff, but also on the number of states. If 
the size of the system is log2(n) of the number of 
system states, then: 
 𝐸𝐼 𝑆 = 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑆 ∗ 𝑒𝑓𝑓(𝑆). 
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Figure 1. Markov chains with different levels of effectiveness 
 
If two systems have equal eff, but one has 
a much larger size, then that system has greater EI. 
There is far more information in a causal model 
with a thousand interacting variables than two. For 
example, consider the causal relationship between 
a light switch and light bulb {LS, LB}. The 
effectiveness of the causal relationship is eff = 1 
(as the on/off state of LS at t perfectly constrains 
the on/off state of LB at t+1). Compare that to a 
light dial (LD) with 256 discriminable states, 
which controls a different light bulb (LB2) that 
possesses 256 discriminable states of luminosity. 
Just examining the sufficiency or necessity of the 
causal relationships would not inform us of the 
crucial causal difference between these two 
systems. But EI would be 1 bit for 𝐿𝑆 → 𝐿𝐵 and 8 
bits for 𝐿𝐷 → 𝐿𝐵!, capturing the fact that a causal  
 
model with the same general structure but more 
states should contain more information, as well as 
that the causal influence of the light dial is 
correspondingly that much greater. 
A system can have a smaller size, but as 
long as it has more eff, its EI can be higher. 
Consider two Markov chains: MA has a high eff, 
but low size, while MB has a large size, but low eff. 
If effA > effB, and sizeA < sizeB, then EI(MA) > 
EI(MB) only if !""!!""!  !    !"#$!!"#$! . This means that if 
sizeB >> sizeA then there must larger relative 
differences in effectiveness, such that effA >>> 
effB, for MA to have higher EI.  
EI is a good measure of causal structure 
because it is sensitive solely to the structure of the 
TPM. As ID = Hmax, the marginal probability p(x) is 
screened off and the analysis is solely dependent 
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on the conditional probabilities p(y|x), i.e., the 
causal structure. Notably, EI ultimately succeeds 
for the same reason that causal effects should be 
identified by the application of randomized trials 
(Fisher 1935). 
 
Causal analysis across scales. Any system can be 
represented in different ways, via different causal 
models. Here, we only consider discrete systems 
with a finite number of states and/or elements. The 
microscopic causal model of such a system is its 
most fine-grained representation in space and time 
(Sm). But systems can also be considered at scales 
above Sm, as many different macro causal models 
(SM). The set of all possible causal models, {S}, is 
entirely fixed by the base Sm. In technical terms 
this known as supervenience: given the lowest 
scale of any system (the base), all the subsequent 
higher scales of that system are fixed (Davidson 
1970; Stalnaker 1996). Due to multiple 
realizability, different Sm’s may share the same SM.  
 Macro causal models are defined as a 
mapping: 𝑀: 𝑆! → 𝑆! . A macroscale can be a 
mapping in space, time, or both. As they are 
similar mathematically, here we only examine 
spatial mappings (but see Hoel et al. 2013;2016 
for temporal examples). One universal definitional 
feature of a macroscale, in space and/or time, is its 
reduced size: SM must always be of a smaller 
cardinality than Sm. For instance, a macro causal 
model may be a mapping of states that leaves out 
(considers exogenous) some of the states in the 
micro causal model. 
Some macro causal models are coarse-
grains: they map many microstates onto a single 
macrostate. Microstates, as long as they are 
mapped to the same macrostate, are treated 
identically at the macroscale (but note that they 
themselves don’t have to be identical at the 
microscale). A coarse-grain over elements would 
group two or more micro-elements together into a 
single macro-element. Macrostates and elements 
are therefore similar to those in thermodynamics: 
defined as invariant of underlying micro-identities, 
whatever those might be. For instance, if two 
micro elements A & B are mapped into a macro 
element, switching the state of A and B should not 
change the macrostate. In thermodynamics, 
temperature is such a macrostate of molecular 
movement, and in neuroscience, an action 
potential is such a macrostate of ion channel 
openings. In terms of causal analysis, this means 
that a coarse-grained intervention is:  
 𝑑𝑜 𝑆! = 𝑠! = !! !" !!!!!,!!!,!∈!!  
 
where n is the number of microstates (si) mapped 
into SM. Put simply, a coarse-grained intervention 
is an average over a set of micro interventions. In 
general, when a set of macro interventions are 
applied each member of ID is 1/m (where m is the 
number of macrostates). That is, for the states 
explicitly represented in the macro model, ID is 
still applied equiprobably (and therefore 
accordance with Fisher (1935)). So despite the fact 
that ID may no longer equal Hmax over all (micro) 
system states, it will over the set of macrostates 
explicitly included in the macro causal model. 
 
Causal emergence. A simple example of causal 
emergence is a Markov chain Sm with n = 8 
possible states, with the TPM: 
 
𝑆! =
1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 01/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 01/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 01/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 01/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 01/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 01/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
 
The effectiveness of Sm is very low (eff = 0.18) and 
so EI(Sm) is only 0.55 bits. A search over all 
possible mappings reveals a TPM of the macro 
causal model with EImax(SM) = 1 bit:  
 𝑆! = 1 00 1  
 
demonstrating the causal emergence of 0.45 bits. 
In this mapping, the first 7 states have all been 
grouped into a single macrostate. Note that even 
though these microstates have been grouped into a 
macrostate this doesn’t mean that these states 
actually have to be equivalent for there to be 
causal emergence. For instance, if the TPM of Sm 
is: 
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𝑆! =
1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5 0 0 01/7 3/7 1/7 0 1/7 0 1/7 00 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 01/7 0 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 2/7 01/9 2/9 2/9 1/9 0 2/9 1/9 01/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 01/6 1/6 0 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
 
then the transition profiles (SF |S = si) are different 
for each microstate. However, EImax is still at the 
same macro level (EI(SM) = 1 bit > EI(Sm) = 0.81 
bits). 
 How is it possible for the macro causal 
model to possess EImax? While all macro causal 
models inherently have a smaller size, there may 
be an increase in eff. As stated previously, for two 
Markov chains, EI(Mx) > EI(My) if 
!""!!""!!  !"#$!!"#$! . 
Since the ratio of eff can increase to a greater 
degree than the accompanying decrease in the 
ratio of size, the macro can beat the micro. 
 Consider a generalized case of causal 
emergence: a Markov chain for which every n – 1 
state has the same 1/n – 1 probability to transition 
to any of the set of n – 1 states. The remaining 
state nz transitions to itself with p = 1. For such a 
system EImax(SM) = 1 bit, no matter how large the 
size of the system is (from a mapping M of nz into 
macrostate 1 and all remaining n – 1 states into a 
macrostate 2). In this case as the size increases 
EI(Sm) decreases: lim!→! 𝐸𝐼 𝑆! = 0  as lim!→! 1 (𝑛 − 1) = 𝑝 = 0 . A macro causal 
model SM can remain the same even as the 
underlying microscale drops off to an infinitesimal 
EI. This also means that the upper limit of the 
difference between EI(SM) and EI(Sm) (the amount 
of causal emergence) is theoretically bounded only 
by log2(m), where m is the number of macrostates. 
Causal emergence is possible in 
completely deterministic systems, as long as they 
are degenerate. For instance, consider a network of 
binary logic gates, first introduced in Hoel et al. 
(2013). At Sm it is six micro elements, all of which 
operate as deterministic AND gates (binary nodes 
which equal 1 at t iff both inputs are 1 at t-1). The 
connectivity and TPMs of both Sm and the 
macroscale with EImax are shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. Causal emergence via the reduction of degeneracy. A. Deterministic micro causal model Sm 
(top) and its associated TPM (bottom, in gray-scale). B. The macro causal model SM with EImax, found by 
searching all possible macroscales, and its associated TPM (bottom). 
 Determinism for the system at both the 
microscale and macroscale is 1. But at the 
microscale EI(Sm) = 2.43 bits as eff(Sm) = 0.41. 
Effectiveness is low because degeneracy is high, at 
0.59. In comparison the SM has an EImax value of 3 
bits, as eff (SM) = 1 (as degeneracy(SM) = 0). 
 
Causal emergence as a special case of 
Shannon’s channel capacity. Previously, the few 
notions of emergence that have directly compared 
macro to micro have implicitly or explicitly 
focused solely on the concept of compression 
(Wolpert 2014; Shalizi and Moore 2000; 
Crutchfield 1994). This is understandable, given 
that the signature of any macro causal model is its 
reduced state-space. However, compression is 
either lossy or at best lossless. Focusing on 
compression ensures that the macro can at best be 
the compressed equivalent of the micro. In 
contrast, in the theory of causal emergence the  
dominant concept is Shannon’s discovery of the 
capacity of a communication channel, and the 
ability of codes to take advantage of that to 
achieve reliable communication.  
An information channel is composed of 
two finite sets, X and Y, and a collection of 
transition probabilities p(y|x) for each x ∈ X, such 
that for every x and y, p(y|x) ≥ 0 and for every x, 𝑝 𝑦 𝑥 = 1!  (a collection known as the channel 
matrix). The interpretation is that X and Y are the 
input and output of the channel, respectively 
(Cover and Thomas 2012). The channel is 
governed by the channel matrix, which is a fixed 
entity. Similarly, causal structure is governed by 
the relationship between interventions and their 
effects, which is a fixed entity. Notably, both 
channels and causal structures can be represented 
as TPMs, and in a situation where a channel 
matrix contains the same transition probabilities as 
some set of state transitions, the TPMs would be 
identical. Causal structure is a matrix that 
transforms previous states into future ones. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Causal models as information channels. Causal structure transforms interventions into effects. 
A macro causal model is a form of encoding for the interventions (inputs) and effects (outputs). TPM 
probabilities in gray scale. 
 
Mutual information I(X,Y) was originally 
the measure proposed by Claude Shannon (1949) 
to capture the rate of information that can be 
transmitted over a channel. Mutual information 
I(X,Y) can be expressed as: 
 𝐼 𝑋,𝑌 = 𝐻 𝑋 − 𝐻(𝑋|𝑌) 
 
which has a clear interpretation in the causal 
terminology already introduced. H(X) represents 
the total possible entropy of the source, which in 
causal analysis is some set of interventions over all 
the states of the system, where all members of 
p(X) are 1/n, so H(X) = log2(n) = size. The 
conditional entropy H(X|Y) captures how much 
information is left over about X once Y is taken 
into account. H(X|Y) therefore has a clear causal 
interpretation as the amount of information lost by 
the lack of effectiveness of the system (1-eff). 
More specifically, starting with 𝐻 𝑋|𝑌 =𝐻 𝑋 − 𝐼(𝑋,𝑌),  which with the substitution of 
causal terminology is 𝐻 𝑋 𝑌 = 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 −𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∗ 𝑒𝑓𝑓 , shows via algebraic transposition 
that H(X|Y) indeed captures the lack of 
effectiveness since 𝐻 𝑋 𝑌 = 1 − 𝑒𝑓𝑓 ∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 . 
Overall then:  
 𝐸𝐼 𝑆 = 𝐼 𝑋,𝑌 = 𝐻 𝑋 − 𝐻 𝑋 𝑌 = 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 − 1 − 𝑒𝑓𝑓 ∗𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 = 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∗ 𝑒𝑓𝑓. 
 
In comparing the macro to the micro, 
while H(X) is necessarily decreasing at the 
macroscale, the conditional entropy H(X|Y) may be 
decreasing to a greater degree, which allows the 
macro to beat the micro. 
Shannon also proposed that 
communication channels have a certain capacity. 
The capacity is a channel’s ability to transform 
inputs into outputs in the most informative and 
reliable manner. As Shannon discovered, the rate 
of information transmitted over a channel is 
sensitive to changes in the input probability 
distribution p(X). The capacity of a channel (C) is 
found by the set of inputs that maximize the 
mutual information, which is also the maximal rate 
at which it can reliably transmit information: 
 𝐶 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥! ! 𝐼(𝑋,𝑌). 
 
The theory of causal emergence reveals 
that there is an analogous causal capacity of a 
system. The causal capacity (CC) is a system’s 
ability to transform interventions into effects in the 
maximal informative and efficacious manner: 
 𝐶𝐶 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 !! 𝐸𝐼(𝑆). 
  
Just as changes to the input probability 
p(X) to a channel can increase I(X,Y), so can 
changes to the intervention distribution (ID) in turn 
increase EI. The use of a macro causal model, and 
the corresponding application of macro 
interventions, can warp the ID, leading to causal 
emergence. The macro causal model with EImax is 
the one that fully uses the causal capacity of the 
system. From this it is clear what higher 
spatiotemporal scales of a system are: a form of 
channel coding for causal structure. A macroscale 
of a system is a code that removes the uncertainty 
of causal relationships, thus using more of the 
available causal capacity. An example of such 
causal coding is given using the TPM in Figure 3 
with input X and output Y (t by t+1): 
 
𝑋⟶ 𝑌 = 1/3 1/3 1/3 01/3 1/3 1/3 01/3 1/3 1/3 00 0 0 1 . 
 
To send a message through a channel matrix with 
these properties one defines some 
encoding/decoding function. The message might 
be some binary string like {001011010011} 
generated at random (such as via the application of 
ID). The encoding function 𝜙: 𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒 →{𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟} is a rule that associates some channel 
input with some output, along with some decoding 
function 𝜓 . The encoding/decoding functions 
together create the codebook. For simplicity issues 
like prefixes and instantaneous decoding are 
ignored here. 
 An encoding function is a microscale code 
if it is a one-to-one mapping 𝜙: 𝑥!, 𝑥!, 𝑥!, 𝑥! →{00,01,10,11}  with a corresponding one-to-one 
decoding function: 
 𝜓: 00,01,10,11 → {𝑦!, 𝑦!, 𝑦!, 𝑦!}  , as each 
microstate x is assumed to carry its own unique 
message. Assuming the message is generated by 
applying ID then the source has entropy H(X) = 2 
bits as its four possible states are successive 
randomized interventions (so that p(1) = 0.5). 
Each code specifies a rate of transmission R = n/t, 
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where t is every state-transition of the system and 
n is the number of bits sent per transition. For the 
microscale code of the system shown above the 
rate R = 2 bits, although these 2 bits are not sent 
reliably. This is because H(X|Y) is large: 1.19 bits, 
so I(X,Y) = H(X) – H(X|Y) = EI = 0.81 bits. In 
application, this means that if one wanted to send 
the message {00,10,11,01,00,11}, this would take 
6 state transitions (channel usages) and there 
would be a very high probability of numerous 
errors. This is because the rate exceeds the 
capacity at the microscale. 
 In contrast, we can define a macroscale 
encoding function as the many-to-one mapping Φ: 𝑥!, 𝑥!, 𝑥! → 0 ;    𝑥! → 1  and similarly Ψ: 𝑦!, 𝑦!, 𝑦! → 0 ;    𝑦! → 1  such that only 
macrostates are assumed to carry a unique 
message. The rate of this code in the figure above 
is now twice as slow to send any message, as R = 
1 bit, and the corresponding entropy H(X) is 
halved (1 bit; so that p(1) = 0.83). However, I(X,Y) 
= EI = 1 bit, as H(X|Y) = 0, showing that reliable 
communication can proceed at the rate of 1 bit, 
higher than with using a microscale code. In the 
macroscale case, if one wanted to send the 
message {00,10,11,01,00,11} this would take 12 
transitions (as sending {00} using this code means 
sending {x1,x1} twice) but there would be zero 
errors in that transmission. While the absolute rate 
of channel usage has gone down, the reliability of 
that transmission has increased by such a degree 
that it outweighs the decrease. This rate of reliable 
communication is equal to the capacity C. This is 
identical to the necessary decrease in the size of 
the state-space of a causal model at a macroscale, 
and how this can be outweighed by an increase in 
the eff. One can think of the channel efficiency as 
the coefficient I(X,Y)/H(X) (Press et al. 2007), and 
the search across input distributions increases this 
coefficient. This is just how the effectiveness of a 
causal structure is EI/size, and the search across 
models increases the effectiveness. 
Interestingly, it is provable causal 
emergence requires symmetry breaking. A channel 
is defined as symmetric when its rows p(y|x) and 
columns are permutations of each other. A channel 
is weakly symmetric if the row probabilities are 
permutations of each other and all the column 
sums are equal. For such a symmetric channel the 
input distribution that generates Imax has been 
proven to be the uniform distribution Hmax (Cover 
and Thomas 2012). When using the micro causal 
model of a system, ID = Hmax. Therefore, for 
symmetric or weakly symmetric systems, the 
microscale provides the best causal model without 
any need to search across model space. It is only 
in systems with asymmetrical causal relationships 
that causal emergence can occur. 
 
Causal capacity can approximate channel 
capacity as model choice increases. The causal 
model that uses the full causal capacity of a 
system has an associated ID, which achieves its 
success in the same manner as the input 
distribution that uses the full channel capacity: by 
sending only a subset of the possible messages 
during channel usage. But while the causal 
capacity is bounded by the channel capacity, it is 
not always identical to it. Because the warping of 
ID is a function of model choice, which is 
constrained in various ways (a subset of possible 
distributions), causal capacity is a special case of 
the more general channel capacity (defined over 
all possible distributions). Coarse-graining is one 
way to manipulate (warp) ID: by moving up to a 
macro scale. It is not the only way. Choices made 
in causal modeling, including the choice of scale, 
but also choice of initial condition, and whether to 
classify variables as exogenous or endogenous to 
the model, can all also warp ID.  
For example, consider a system that’s a 
Markov chain of 8 states: 
 
𝑆! =
1/8 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/81/8 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/81/8 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/81/8 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/81/8 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/81/8 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/80 0 0 0 0 0 1 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 
 
where some states in the chain are completely 
random in their transitions. If the ID contains all 
possible states, EI = 0.63 bits. Yet every causal 
model implicitly classifies variables as 
endogenous or exogenous to the model. For 
instance, here, we can take only the last two states 
(s7, s8) as endogenous to the macro causal model, 
while leaving the rest of the states as exogenous. 
This restriction is still a macro model because it 
has a smaller state-space. For this macro causal 
model of the system EI = 1 bit, meaning that 
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causal emergence occurs, again because the ID is 
warped by model choice. This warping can itself 
be quantified as the loss of entropy in the 
intervention distribution, H(ID). 
  𝐼!(𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑝𝑒𝑑) = 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/2 1/2↑𝐼! = 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/8  
  
While leaving noisy or degenerate states 
exogenous to a causal model can lead to causal 
emergence, so can leaving certain elements 
exogenous.  
Notably, there are multiple ways to leave 
elements exogenous (to not explicitly include them 
in the macro model). For instance, exogenous 
elements are often implicit background 
assumptions in causal models. Such background 
conditions may consist of setting an exogenous 
element to a particular state (freezing) for the 
causal analysis, or setting the system to an initial 
condition. Alternatively, one could allow an 
element to vary under the influence of the applied 
ID. This latter form has been called “black 
boxing”, where an element’s internal workings, or 
role in the system, cannot be examined (Ashby 
1956; Bung 1963). In Figure 4, both types of 
model choices are shown, each leading to causal 
emergence. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Multiple types of model choice can lead to causal emergence. A. The full microscopic model of 
the system, where all elements are endogenous. B. The same system but modeled at a macroscale where 
only elements {ABC} are endogenous, while {D} is exogenous: it was set to an initial state of 0 as a 
background condition of the causal analysis. C. The full microscopic model of a system with six 
elements. D. The same system as in C but at a macroscale with the element {F} exogenous: it varies in 
the background in response to the application of the ID. EI is higher for both macro causal models. 
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Figure 5. A macro model that demonstrates different types of model choice. A. The microscale of an 
eight-element system. B. The same system with some elements coarse-grained, others “black boxed”, and 
some left in a particular initial condition. 
 
Rather than dictating precisely what types of 
model choices are “allowable” in the construction 
of causal models, a more general principle can be 
distinguished: the more ways to warp ID via 
model-building choices, the closer the causal 
capacity approximates the actual channel capacity. 
For example, consider the system in Figure 5A. In 
Fig. 5B, a macroscale is shown that demonstrates 
causal emergence using various types of model 
choice (by coarse-graining, black-boxing an 
element, and setting a particular initial condition 
for an exogenous element). As can be seen in Fig. 
6, the more degrees of freedom in terms of model 
choice there are, the closer the causal capacity 
approximates the channel capacity. The channel 
capacity of this system was found via gradient 
ascent after the simulation of millions of random 
probability distributions p(X), searching for the 
one that maximizes I. 
Model choice warps the microscale ID in such a 
way that it moves closer to p(X), as shown in Fig. 
6B. As model choice increases, the EImax 
approaches the Imax of the channel capacity (Fig. 
6C). 
Causal emergence is a phenomenon based 
on using information theory to quantify and 
capture causation and causal structure. What of 
measures beyond EI? Indeed, it has already been 
proven that integrated information, which has 
similarities to EI but is a more complex measure, 
can peak at both coarse-grained macroscales (Hoel 
et al. 2016) and “black boxed” macroscales 
(Marshall et al. 2016). One consequence of this 
research is that the more complex the 
informational measure of causation, the more 
possible model choices there will be that will take 
advantage of the causal capacity of a system.  
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Figure 6. Causal capacity approximates the channel capacity as more degrees of freedom in model 
choices are allowed. A. The ID of various models for the system in Fig.5, getting closer to the p(X) that 
gives Imax. B. The earth mover’s distance (Rubner et al. 2000) from each ID  to the input distribution p(X) 
of the channel capacity Imax, as more model choice is added. C. Increasing degrees of model choice leads 
to an EImax that is close to Imax (all these steps together end in the macroscale shown in Fig. 5B). 
 
Discussion. The theory of causal emergence 
directly challenges the reductionist assumption 
that the best causal model of any system is its 
microscale. Causal emergence reveals a 
contrasting and counterintuitive phenomenon: 
sometimes the map is better than the territory. As 
shown here, this has a precedent with Shannon’s 
discovery of the capacity of a communication 
channel, which was also thought of as 
counterintuitive at the time. Here an analogous 
idea of a causal capacity of a system has been 
developed using effective information. Effective 
information, an information-theoretic measure of 
causation, is assessed by the application of an 
intervention distribution. However, in the 
construction of causal models, model choice warps 
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the intervention distribution, which in turn reveals 
a system’s causal capacity, which might be much 
greater than that used by its microscale 
representation. Causal capacity can approach the 
channel capacity, particularly as degrees of model 
choice increase. The choice of a model’s scale, its 
elements and states, its background conditions, its 
initial conditions, what variables to leave 
exogenous and in what manner, and so on, all 
result in warping of the intervention distribution 
ID. All of these make the state-space of the system 
smaller, so can be classified as macroscales, yet all 
may possibly lead to causal emergence. 
Previously, some have argued (Campbell 
1974; Ellis 2016) that macroscales may enact top-
down causation: that the higher-level laws of a 
system somehow constrain or cause in some 
unknown way the lower-law levels. Top-down 
causation has been considered as contextual 
effects, such as a wheel rolling downhill (Sperry 
1969), or as higher scales fulfilling the different 
Aristotelian types of causation (Auletta et al. 2008; 
Ellis 2015). However, varying notions of 
causation, as well as a reliance on examples where 
the different scales of a system are left loosely 
defined, has led to much confusion between actual 
causal emergence (when higher scales are truly 
causally efficacious) and things like contextual 
effects, whole-part relations, or even mental 
causation, all of which are lumped together under 
“top-down causation.” In comparison, the theory 
of causal emergence can rigorously prove that 
macroscales are error-correcting causal codes, and 
that many systems have a causal capacity that 
exceeds their microscale representations. Note that 
the theory of causal emergence does not contradict 
other theories of emergence, such as proposals that 
truly novel laws or properties may come into being 
at higher scales in systems (Broad 1925). It does, 
however, indicate that for some systems only 
modeling at a macroscale uses the full causal 
capacity of the system; it is this way that higher 
scales can have causal influence above and beyond 
the microscale. 
One objection to causal emergence is that, 
since it requires asymmetry, it is trivially 
impossible if the microscale of a system happens 
to be composed only of causal relationships in the 
form of logical biconditionals (for which 
effectiveness = 1, as determinism = 1 and 
degeneracy = 0). This is a stringent condition, yet 
whether or not this is true for physical systems I 
take as an open question, as deriving causal 
structure from physics is an unfinished research 
program (Frisch 2014), as is physics itself. Even if 
it were true that the microscale of physics has this 
stringent biconditional causal property for all 
systems, the theory of causal emergence would 
still show us how to pick scales of interest in 
systems where the microscale is unknown,, 
difficult to model, or subject to noise at the lowest 
level we can experimentally observe or intervene 
upon. 
Another possible objection to causal 
emergence is that it is not natural but rather 
enforced upon a system via an experimenter’s 
application of an intervention distribution. For 
formalization purposes, it is the applier of the 
do(x) operator who is the source of the 
intervention distribution. However, nature itself 
may intervene upon a system with statistical 
regularities, just like an intervention distribution. 
Some of these naturally occurring input 
distributions may have a viable interpretation as a 
macro causal model. In this sense, some systems 
may be naturally microscale or macroscale, 
depending on their own causal capacity and the 
probability distribution of some natural source of 
driving input. 
The application of the theory of causal 
emergence to fields such as neuroscience is 
already underway (Hoel 2016). Specifically, it 
may help solve longstanding problems in 
neuroscience involving scale, such as the debate 
over whether brain circuitry functions at the scale 
of neural ensembles or individual neurons 
(Buxhoeveden and Casanova 2002; Yuste 2015). 
It has also been proposed that the brain integrates 
information at a higher level (Tononi 2008) and it 
was proven that integrated information can indeed 
peak at a macroscale in Hoel et al. (2016). An 
experimental way to resolve these debates is to 
systematically measure EI in ever-larger groups of 
neurons, eventually arriving at or approximating 
the cortical scale with EImax (Hoel et al. 2013; 
Tononi et al. 2016). If there are such privileged 
scales in a system then intervention and 
experimentation should focus on those scales. 
Finally, the phenomenon of causal 
emergence provides a general explanation as to 
why science and engineering take diverse 
spatiotemporal scales of analysis, regularly 
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consider systems as isolated from other systems, 
and only consider a small repertoire of physical 
states in particular initial conditions. It is because 
scientists and engineers unwittingly search for 
causal models that use a significant portion of a 
system’s causal capacity, rather than just building 
the most detailed microscopic causal model 
possible. 
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